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Drugs and Democracy in the Caribbean
IVELAW L. GRIFFITH*
INTRODUCTION
I appreciate that part of this panel pertains to global intersections
because there is a tendency often to focus either on the United States or
on Europe; at democracy and the impact of phenomena on it in those
contexts, without recognizing or accepting that there are other parts of
the globe that warrant even greater attention. I want to bring a region
called the Caribbean into the picture, and to suggest that although the
narcotics phenomenon is not unique to the Caribbean, it has significantly
impacted democracy there.
As we move closer to a new era-the 2 1st Century and a new Mil-
lennium-I find myself casting my mind back to old eras, especially the
Enlightenment period. One of my favorite Enlightenment scholars is
Voltaire. He had a way of saying to people "Before we start our discus-
sion, let's define our terms." Let's clear "the definitional mine field," so
to speak. He liked to pose questions-"What?" "How?" "Why?"-in
engaging in any serious discourse. I find considerable usefulness in
Voltaire's approach in looking at the link between drugs and democracy
in the Caribbean.
One question that might be raised is: what exactly do we mean by
"the drug problem?" My second question is a "how" question. How is
the drug phenomenon related to democracy? One can devote an entire
conference to either issue, but I'll try to use five or six minutes to sug-
gest just a couple of linkages; areas in which the phenomenon of drugs
has implications for the pursuit and operation of democracy, in a variety
of ways.
DRUGS PHENOMENON
One of the first things that must be recognized with regards to "the
problem of drugs" is that we are not dealing with one problem, but with
a multidimensional phenomenon. We often get carried away with the
media portrayal of drugs in the Caribbean in terms of trafficking. But
trafficking is only part of the problem component of the phenomenon.
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There is a production part, and an abuse part of the phenomenon. Crack
babies, for instance, are not unique to Miami, New York, and Los Ange-
les. They exist in the Caribbean: in Puerto Rico, the Dominican Repub-
lic, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and elsewhere. Moreover, one
cannot leave money laundering out of the matrix.
I am suggesting, therefore, that in terms of defining "the problem of
drugs", one needs to go beyond looking for one problem, and to see a
matrix with a variety of elements; one is production-related; another is
trafficking; one is consumption and abuse; and the fourth pertains to
money laundering. Moreover, there are linkages among those areas.
There is, of course, variability among these problems within the Carib-
bean, as there is variability elsewhere. Production levels vary; some
places are more significant for trafficking of certain substances than
others; certain countries are more vulnerable to money laundering than
others.
Fundamentally, then, we are not looking at a one-dimensional phe-
nomenon; we are dealing with a phenomenon with many dimensions. A
few vignettes will serve both to underscore this point as well as provide
an appreciation of the scope of the phenomenon.
• Cocaine seizures in 1993 for just five Caribbean countries-the Baha-
mas, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica-totaled about
3,300 kilos. The 1997 seizures for those same nations were 9,135
kilos-an increase of 177 percent.
• Operation Dinero, and international money laundering sting operation
conducted out of tiny Anguilla from January 1992 to December 1994 led
to the seizure of nine tons of cocaine and US $90 million worth of
assets, including expensive paintings, Pablo Picasso's Head of a Beggar
among them.
* In 1995 Puerto Rico had the highest per capita murder rate in the
United States, with 64 percent of the 680 murders related to drugs. They
had 868 murders in 1996, and 80 percent of them were drug-related.
* In June 1993, there was a strange shower over the Demerara river in
Guyana: 364 kilos of cocaine and US $24,000. The shower came from
a plane making an airdrop, part of a Colombia-Venezuela-Guyana-
United States drug network.
• Between 1993 and 1997, close to 7,000 Jamaican deportees were
returned to the island, most of them for drug-related crimes committed
in the United States, Canada, and Britain.
• In February 1997, the Dutch ambassador in Suriname told Suriname's
Foreign Minister that 195 drug couriers from Suriname had been
arrested during 1996 at the Schipol international airport near Amster-
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dam, compared to 51 in 1995. Indeed, Holland convicted former Suri-
name military ruler, Desi Bouterse on trafficking and other offences.
- Operation Summer Storm, which was mounted June 18-26, 1997, in
the Caribbean, produced 828 arrests and the seizure of 57 kilos of
cocaine, 340 kilos of cured marijuana, over 440,000 marijuana plants,
and 122 weapons, among other things.
• On July 21, 1997, 4,175 kilos of pure cocaine were retrieved from the
Rickey II, a Colombian cargo ship which had stopped in Puerto Cabello,
Venezuela to take on cargo destined for Trinidad and Tobago.
* During October - November 1997, operation Rain, an operation
targeting drug traffickers, weapons smugglers, and money launderers in
the U.S. Virgin Islands, resulted in the arrest of 19 people, including
members of the business and social elite there, and the confiscation of
$240,000, vehicles and speed boats, businesses, and bank accounts.
• Between 1995 and 1997 in Jamaica, 10,332 people were arrested for
drug possession, peddling, and trafficking; 9,464 locals and 868 foreign-
ers. The figure for 1990 - 1997 is a whopping 24, 242; 21,197 locals
and 3,045 foreigners.
• In February 1998, eleven people in Martinique were sent to prison for
smuggling 1,980 pounds of cocaine between 1995 and 1997. The leader
of the trafficking group, a St. Lucian, received the highest sentence - 12
years.
* In a series of raids across Puerto Rico on December 17, 1997 the
police and National Guard there arrested 1,039 people and confiscated
1,356 bags of cocaine, 133 bags of heroin, 58 guns, 60 cars and vans,
and $205,582 in drug money.
* On February 28, 1998, U.S. and Caribbean officials seized 3,780 kilos
of cocaine, worth US$266.4 million, from a 183-foot freighter -Nicole
- in the Turks and Caicos Islands. The ship was flying a Honduran flag,
had originated in Colombia, and was bound for Miami.
* Jamaican police found 600 kilos of cocaine in the bushes near the
Boscobel airport in St. Mary's, on the north coast, on March 17, 1998.
• During March 1998, a New York-based Guyanese was found at the
Cheddie Jagan International Airport-Timehri trying to smuggle 909
grammes of cocaine to the United States in the false bottom of a suit-
case. On March 9 he was fined G$10,000 and sent to prison for four
years.
• Early September 1998, two women from the island of Dominica were
fined EC$100,000 each in St. Lucia for trying smuggle one kilo (each)
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of cocaine from Dominica to the United States, via St. Lucia. The drugs
were found around and within their private parts.
• Trinidadian magistrate Jai Narine and his family had to be placed
under special police protection in September 1998 following the receipt
of credible murder and kidnapping threats. At the time the magistrate
was presiding over a drug trial.
• In October 1998 U.S. law enforcement authorities helped their
Guyanese counterparts seize 3,254 kilos of cocaine aboard a St. Vincent
registered vessel-M.V. Danielsen. The 260-foot ship, in transit from
Panama, had docked in port Gerogetown to take on rice consigned to
buyers in Holland.
• An U.S. company, Cupid Foundations, closed operations in Jamaica in
November 1998 after 22 years of operating there. The company could
no longer afford the losses incurred with the seizure by the U.S. Cus-
toms of its merchandise because of attempts to smuggle drugs into the
United States among its clothing.
• In December 1998 Regional Security System troops, U.S. Marines,
and Drug Enforcement Administration officers joined the St. Vincent
and the Grenadines Special Service Unit in conducting Operation
Weedeater. The operation destroyed 1,162,496 marijuana plants, 1,400
pounds of cured marijuana, and 151 huts used to cure marijuana. Offi-
cials also seized weapons and ammunition.
• Dillion Chambers, a 25-year-old Jamaica "drug mule" collapsed and
died in the Bahamas on February 3, 1999 after arriving from Jamaica
with 129 packets of cocaine, weighing more than one kilo, in his stom-
ach. Several of the packets burst killing him.
• A 61-year-old Guyanese man, Llewellyn Gray, began serving a four-
year prison term in Trinidad and Tobago on February 9, 1999. Gray had
been arrested at the Piarco International Airport in July 1998 while
attempting to smuggle 2.8 kilos of cocaine from Guyana to Canada
through Trinidad. The drugs were found strapped to his stomach and
legs.
IMPACT ON DEMOCRACY
The drug phenomenon, then, is a multidimensional one. Taking a
lead from Voltaire, we have settled the "what' question about it. But
before we can proceed to the second question - How is the drug phe-
nomenon related to democracy? - there is a preliminary, and intermedi-
ary, question to be settled: what do we mean by democracy?
Whether one views democracy in terms of the classic Schumpeter-
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ian approach developed in 1947' or goes beyond it, at least three things
are central to democracy, and central to democracy as practiced in the
Caribbean. One is the contestation for power. This is a very elementary
aspect for people who define democracy simply as free elections. We
might examine later ways in which contestation for power is influenced
by people who traffic or produce drugs. But it would be useful to note
now that they finance electoral campaigns; they want certain candidates
in power in order to influence the policies and programs those people
pursue. Whether one knows it or not they thereby affect contestation.
Participation is a second central component of democracy, not only
in the Caribbean, but universally, especially if one views democracy in a
way that goes beyond Schumpeter. Participation in interest groups, in
political parties, and by having the media facilitate discussion, investiga-
tion, and commentary of one kind or another. But, critical to democracy
is a third element - the third part of the tripod )- institutions, which are
maintained to protect the civil and political rights of individuals and to
enhance and pursue social justice. Thus, that intermediate question
"what do we mean by democracy?" forces us to appreciate that we are
talking about contestation for power, participation, and institutions.
How does the drug phenomenon affect the workings of power con-
testation, participation, or institutions? There are multiple effects, but
time only permits me to mention two. The first pertains to corruption.
There is a powerful ability to corrupt on the part of people who traffic,
produce, launder money, and sell drugs. It is a necessity for the pursuit
of their practice. Whether the corruption is a function of acts of omis-
sion or acts of commission is immaterial. It is one of the very corrosive
consequences of the drug phenomenon, with a direct impact on the insti-
tutions of good governance.
This is not so only for institutions of government, or those having
to do with the public sector. The private sector is also implicated. In
thinking about corruption and drugs people often look at the police and
the military, key public sector agencies. Yet private sector corruption is
just as dangerous as public sector corruption. A former U.S. ambassador
in the Caribbean asked me a couple years ago: "Professor, what can we
do to deal with this money laundering problem?" I said, "I submit
ambassador that most of the money laundering in the Caribbean and
Latin America does not profit little cambios or bodegas; big banks, real
estate companies, and other powerful private sector entities benefit
mostly. And they all have political clients and constituents, give money
to campaigns, and form political action committees (PACS). They cer-
1. For examination of the classic approach, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1947).
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tainly would not permit government agencies to take the kind of drastic
anti-money laundering measures than might be necessary." Either way,
whether by or for the benefit of people in the public or private sector,
corruption is inimical to democracy, irrespective of whether it facilitates
money laundering, drug production, or drug trafficking.
Hence, corruption is one of those deleterious elements flowing
from the drug phenomenon that has a direct impact on the way in which
democratic institutions are managed, and it can affect the contestation
for power. One may say, in the Caribbean context, that what happened
in the Dominican Republic in 1996 with drug money influencing elec-
tions was small measure compared to what happened in Colombia and
Panama earlier. But, if you have the impact of drugs and drug money
affecting contestation for power, given that power contestation is a criti-
cal element of democracy, then democracy is malfunctional. It is inter-
esting to note what most countries in the hemisphere agreed on when
they signed the Inter-American Convention on Corruption in 1996:
"corruption undermines the legitimacy of public institutions, and strikes
at society, moral order, and justice, as well as the comprehensive devel-
opment of peoples." Thus, corruption is one of the powerful links
between drugs and democracy in the Caribbean.
Criminal justice is a second area. Quite notable is the fact that
crime has skyrocketed in many parts of the region, and much of it relates
to drugs. It is no consolation for people in Jamaica to say that crime is
high in Brazil, or for those in Santo Domingo to remind us that crime is
high in Miami. Moreover, the crime connection has invidious linkages
that extend beyond the Caribbean, both in relation to Caribbean nation-
als abroad, and in relation to actions by other countries in response to the
criminal pursuits of some of those nationals. The deportee drama clearly
reveals this latter linkage.
DEPORTEES
In a July 1993 speech to the Jamaican Parliament, National Secur-
ity Minister, K.D. Knight, stated: "Nearly a thousand Jamaicans were
deported from other countries last year, with over 700 coming from the
United States. Most of them, nearly 600, were deported for drug-related
offenses."2 That report was not the last. Neither was it a report of the
largest numbers. Indeed, between 1993 and 1997, over 6,000 Jamaican
deportees were returned to the island from countries in Europe and the
Americas. While the number returned in 1993 was 923, in 1996 it was
2. Government of Jamaica, Parliament, Presentation of the Hon. K.D. Knight, Minister of
National Security and Justice, Budget Sectoral Debate, July 15, 1993, at 11.
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1,158, and in 1997, it was 1,647, according to law-enforcement sources
in Jamaica.
Most of the deportees come from the United States. But the United
States is not the only country that sends criminals back to their home-
lands. For example, of the 1,647 people returned to Jamaica in 1997,
1,213 were from the United States, 257 were from Canada, and 121
were from the United Kingdom. Of course, Jamaica is not the only Car-
ibbean nation to be forced to accept nationals in the Diaspora who have
walked on the wrong side of the law. As a matter of fact, Jamaica is not
the Caribbean country to which most deportees are returned. That dubi-
ous distinction falls to the Dominican Republic. United States immigra-
tion sources indicate that between 1993 and 1997, deportees to the
Dominican Republic from the United States alone numbered 6,582
(while those sent to Jamaica from the United States during the same
period numbered under 5,000).
The population size of the Dominican Republic and Jamaica and
the size of their Diaspora make it understandable that they might have
such huge numbers of their citizens returned from countries in Europe
and the Americas. But the stark contrast between the numbers from
those two nations and the numbers elsewhere is no consolation to policy
makers or scholars in any of the countries involved. Some of the coun-
tries with "small" 1993-97 United States deportee numbers are: Aruba,
10; Bahamas, 265; Belize, 374; Dominica, 57; Guyana, 427; St. Lucia,
52; Trinidad and Tobago, 1,036. Needless to say, these are not the only
Caribbean countries with deportees from the United States, or from else-
where. For example, Suriname and French Guiana frequently return
people to Guyana, and the Cayman Islands is constantly deporting
Jamaicans.
Deportees are returned to their place of birth because of the com-
mittal of a variety of consensual, property, and expressive crimes. How-
ever, most of them are sent back home because of criminal activities
related to drugs. The increasing criminal deportation reflects aggres-
siveness on the part of the United States and other countries in attempt-
ing to cope with some of the political, economic, and criminal justice
dimensions of the drug phenomenon. If nothing else, the deportee con-
nection clearly indicates that the narcotics phenomenon is not a one-
dimensional matter; it is multidimensional.
In a 1993-94 article, I proposed the concept of "geonarcotics" as a
way to examine the nexus between drugs as social phenomenon and
security studies as an intellectual issue-area.3 The concept captures the
3. See Ivelaw L. Griffith, From Cold War Geopolitics to Post Cold War Geonarcotics, 49
INT'L. J. 1, 1-36 (1993-94).
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dynamics of three factors besides drugs: geography, power, and politics.
It posits that the narcotics phenomenon is multidimensional, with four
main problem areas (drug production, consumption-abuse, trafficking,
and money-laundering); that these give rise to actual and potential
threats to the security of states around the world, including crime, arms
trafficking, and narcoterrorism; and that the drug operations and the
activities they spawn precipitate both conflict and cooperation among
various state and non-actors in the international system.
Geography is a factor because of the global spatial dispersion of
drug operations, and because certain physical and social geographic fea-
tures of numerous countries facilitate drug operations. Power involves
the ability of individuals and groups to secure compliant action. In the
drug world, this power is both state and non-state in origin, and in some
cases non-state sources exercise more power than state entities. Politics
revolves around resource allocation in the sense of the ability of power
brokers to determine who gets what, how, and when. Since power in
this milieu is not only state power, resource allocation is correspond-
ingly not exclusively a function of state power-holders. Moreover, poli-
tics becomes perverted, and all the more so where it already was
perverted. In Drugs and Security in the Caribbean I examine the
geonarcotics of the Caribbean.4
While criminal deportation has many benefits in terms of counter-
drug and anti-crime strategies generally and economic and criminal jus-
tice measures specifically for sending countries, it presents several clear
and present dangers to receiving countries. One danger relates to the
spiral in local crime. Government officials throughout the Caribbean
have complained that deportees tend to become involved locally in traf-
ficking and other criminal networks. Jamaica's 1995 Economic and
Social Survey noted, for instance, that deportees are heavily involved in
crime, "particularly the importation and use of firearms, the drug trade,
and money laundering."
I noted earlier that the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and the other
larger nations are not the only ones facing deportee problems. One
important difference between the problem in the larger countries and
that in the smaller ones is the size factor. Because of the very small size
of the populations of Eastern Caribbean countries, for example, and
hence of their migrant populations, and the smaller scale on which their
nationals become involved in drug crimes, they have far fewer depor-
tees. Yet, precisely because of their small size, the (re)introduction of




criminal behavior into those societies by deportees has a dramatic and
traumatic effect on them.
The problem is taxing the resources of Eastern Caribbean and other
countries. Moreover, many of the deportees are former servicemen of
the United States Army or Marines, and they bring their military training
and knowledge of weapons and military hardware to their criminal
enterprise. This creates both a greater sense of apprehension by law
enforcement officials and a bigger practical headache for them, as com-
pared with elsewhere. In one May 1997 case in Guyana, a bungled bur-
glary and shooting incident at the residence of the former Chairman of
the Elections Commission, Rudy Collins, involved the use of laser-
guided weapons by the would-be robbers, all five of whom were killed
in a shoot-out with police; several of the bandits had been deportees.
The situation is so grave that new legislation has been adopted in
some places to allow the police to monitor the movement of deportees
and take preemptive action. Moreover, the deportee issue has been high
on the agenda of several policy fora over recent years, including the
special "Drug Summit" held by CARICOM leaders in December 1996.
Item 5 of the Communiqu6 of that summit, which was held in Barbados,
notes, "Heads of Government noted with equal concern the challenge
facing the region from indiscriminate deportations leading to increased
criminality. In this regard they called for greater cooperation in deporta-
tion procedures."
As a consequence of the increased crime, and serving to further
aggravate the criminal justice situation, is the problem of prison over
-crowding. Most Caribbean prisons are over-crowded, and in most
cases the prisoners are there because of a variety of drug-related
offenses. In the Dominican Republic, for instance, a 1996 survey done
by the General Directorate of Prisons revealed that the people convicted
of drug crimes constituted the single largest group of prisoners in the
country-30 percent of the 10,359 prisoners at the time of the study.
In Guyana, a former prisons director, Cecil Kilkenny, once indi-
cated that the Georgetown prison, which was built to house 350 prison-
ers, was forced to accommodate over 800 people in 1994, and had
accommodated as many as 1,000 prisoners during early 1992. The
Georgetown prison now has a higher official capacity - 510 - but signif-
icant over-crowding still exists there and in most of the other prisons in
Guyana.
In Jamaica the total inmate population of the adult prisons in
December 1991 was 3,705, about 33 per cent above the official capacity
of 2,781. Minister K.D. Knight himself acknowledged in 1993, that
"The overcrowding in our two maximum security correctional institu-
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tions, the General Penitentiary and the St. Catherine District Prison, is
serious, and has triggered serious problems over the years. Each of
these prisons contains about twice as many inmates as they were
designed to hold."'5 In 1994, the overage was "only" 611; in 1995 it was
"merely" 508.
A 1993 inquiry into the situation in Jamaica highlighted the appal-
ling conditions of Jamaican prisons. It was led by Justice Lensley
Wolfe, now Chief Justice of Jamaica. The Wolfe report found that pris-
oners were required to eat with their hands for security reasons, a situa-
tion it deemed "inhuman and degrading treatment." Meals were found
to be generally "revolting in appearance and taste." In some places, "the
diet fed to the cell occupants should be consumed only by pigs." The
Wolfe investigation found that prison indiscipline abounded, and that all
sorts of malfeasance and abuse occurred in Jamaican prisons. A few
reforms were implemented since the presentation of the Wolfe report,
but the situation is still very unpalatable. No wonder, then, that several
serious prison riots broke out in Jamaican prisons in 1997. This is not to
suggest, though, that over-crowding and the horrible conditions alone
explained the riots.
In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, most of the country's six penal
institutions house three and four times the number of people for which
they were intended. The Port of Spain prison, for instance, built in 1812
to accommodate 250 inmates, had a 1993 daily average inmate popula-
tion of 978, up from the 1992 figure of 916. That prison housed an
average of 1,100 people during 1994, and a little less in 1995. The seri-
ous overcrowding presents several critical problems affecting (a) the
provision of medical services, especially given the high incidence of
prisoner-addiction, (b) the maintenance of discipline, particularly
because of increased gang and other violence in prison, (c) the physical
safety of prison officers, and (d) the provision of recreational facilities,
among other things.
The deplorable conditions of the prisons in Trinidad and Tobago
were highlighted in July 1998, when a judge blocked the execution of a
death row inmate on grounds that he had already been subjected to cruel
and inhuman punishment during his imprisonment over the years his
trial worked its way back and forth in the criminal justice system. Jus-
tice Peter Jamadar noted that the convict - Darrin Thomas-had been
forced to live with insufficient light, handcuffed during breaks, and
given inadequate food, among other things. The actions by Justice
Jamadar in offering this response to the prison conditions itself raises
5. Government of Jamaica, Parliament, Presentation of the Hon. K.D. Knight, supra note 2.
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larger questions of criminal justice fairness and equity in Trinidad, ques-
tions that certainly are applicable to other countries in the region.
COPING MEASURES
The deportee headache has both foreign policy and domestic policy
aspects, and Caribbean nations have attempted and initiated actions at
both the international and domestic levels. In the former they have
attempted individually and collectively to stem the tide of the return
from places from which most nationals are sent-the United States and
Canada. In the case of the United States the matter was a high-priority
item on the agenda of the Barbados summit between President Bill Clin-
ton and the 15 Caribbean leaders in May 1997. Efforts by the Caribbean
leaders to halt the practice were futile, but the summit agreed to stream-
line the management of the deportees. Implementation of some of the
terms of the US-Caribbean agreement on deportee management, as well
as on other issues, has begun. But while these are necessary, they are
not sufficient. Other action within Caribbean countries in a variety of
areas is also important.
Some of this action has been initiated. One response has been with
legislation. In 1994, Jamaica adopted the Criminal Justice (Administra-
tion) (Amendment) Act. This law provides for deportees to be deemed
restricted persons, and under Section 54(c) restricted persons are subject
to the imposition of orders, for up to 12 months at a time, to restrict their
residence, force their registration, and compel them to report to police
authorities on a weekly basis. They are also required to inform the
police about intended absences from the registered address when the
absence is for more than a week, and about any planned change of
address. Moreover, the new law provides for a central register of
restricted persons as well as for twelve-month prison terms for violation
of monitoring provisions or for false reporting. The Act also creates a
five-member Restricted Persons Review Tribunal to hear appeals from
persons placed under restriction, and to advise the government on the
maintenance of the system. Guyana plans to emulate Jamaica's legisla-
tive lead in this respect.
The Criminal Justice (Administration) (Amendment) Act, however,
has serious implications for constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of
association and movement. The government has argued that its actions
are constitutional given the "exception clauses" of the fundamental
rights section of the Constitution. For example, under Section 23 of the
Constitution, which guarantees freedoms of assembly and association,
there is the provision that:
Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be
1999]
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held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the
extent that the law in question makes provision (a) which is reason-
ably required (i) in the interest of defense, public safety, public order,
public morality, or public health, or (ii) for the purpose of protecting
the rights and freedoms of other persons.
Nevertheless, Jamaica's former chief prosecutor Glen Andrade
himself once speculated that the law's constitutionality would be chal-
lenged with the very first case brought under it, because of the delicate
constitutional issues involved. Some of these same issues worry lawyers
and human rights activists in Guyana, as the authorities there plan to
follow Jamaica's lead in the area.
But it is not just increased crime, whether deportee or non-deportee
related that worries policy-makers in the region. There is an impact that
relates to efforts to pass legislation that has the potential to undermine
some of the democratic precepts on which Caribbean societies are built.
I want to share an observation by a former Attorney General of Jamaica,
who is now the president of the Jamaican Court of Appeals, about some
of the potential dangers in the criminal justice arena, of trying to grapple
with the phenomenon of drugs:
In our effort to rid our societies of the scourge of drugs and with
some international pressures we are being invited to reverse burdens
of proof and adopt a retroactive confiscatory regime. All this is
understandable. The perceived danger is real, the consequences of
the mischief which we would excise is disastrous. As we contem-
plate effective measures, the nagging question, though, for all of us
remains. Are they just? I remember too that in Jamaica the mon-
goose was imported from India to kill out the snakes. It did a very
good job. The snakes were eliminated. The mongoose then turned
its attention to the chickens. There is a lesson in this. Effective
measures against vermin may be turned to effective use by the ill-
intentioned against decent and law-abiding citizens.6
CONCLUSION
The drug phenomenon in general, and the deportee drama in partic-
ular, place Caribbean leaders between a rock and a hard place. They
face the realities of other nations anti-drug efforts, which they endorse in
principle; but they also face the necessity to honor obligations of state-
hood for people in their Diaspora who have violated laws elsewhere.
But the dilemma exists in relation to democracy also. As many societies
cope with the problems and consequences of drugs, initiatives are being
6. Government of Jamaica, Ministry of Justice. Crime and Justice in the Caribbean:
Keynote Address by the Honorable R. Carl Rattray, Q.C., Minister of Justice and Attorney
General of Jamaica, May 10, 1991.
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undertaken that stand to violate or redefine some of the civil and polit-
ical rights which are central to democracy. Thus, there are clear and
present dangers of drugs with regards to democracy in some Caribbean
societies. Institutions are often undermined, and contestation for power
is inappropriately influenced. When those things happen, democracy
surely is endangered.
